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To judge from the public voice and countenance of religion 
in America at least, there is a preoccupation in religion with 
happiness at the expense of meaning. But between the two poles 
of happiness and meaning there is considerable distance. This 
chapter accepts the problem of meaning as more urgent than the 
problem of happiness. For over against the hopeful prescrip­
tions for the integration of the personality and of social life 
through religion there stands the experience of disintegration 
of the structure of past confidence. Desperately, theologians 
wrestle with ancient symbols to wrest from them new significance 
or reference, or attempt to revivify their lost meaning and 
powers of evocation. In these critical times theological 
thought attempts to referee the contest between the lost soul 
and the powerful chaos of world history. In an intellectual 
landscape scarred by war, diplomatic failure, economic uncer­
tainty, and a wide variety of psychic traumata, theologians 
probe the private egos, society, and even language itself to re­
establish meaning. 
The consideration of meaning as a problem may at first seem 
to be an effort to make intentional confusion for human thought. 
Figuratively it may seem as though the dog of the mind is chas­
ing its own tail. And if it occasionally makes a successful 
grab, it stops short to stand embarrassed at its own frivolity. 
For eventually this special pursuit will result in a most baf­
fling question: What is the meaning of meaning? To minds al­
ready distraught by mushroom clouds and cold wars, this must 
appear as the reduction of human intellectual effort to ultimate 
fruitlessness. Man has become,preoccupied, so it seems, with 
the last logical question, one to which there can be no satis­
factory answer. After all, such a question must be answered in 
the same kinds of words and phrases and out of the same mental 
structures that pose it in the first place. Hence, this is the 
question, so it seems, which will remain as a question forever, 
although what men now require are answers. The philosopher has 
stopped to examine his ideas and methods, indeed to dissect 
them; and runs the risk that he will not be able to put his in­
struments (words, ideas, data) back together again. Hence 
philosophy itself may seem to be not only in court, but already 
in a hopeless prison. The guards blocking escape have these 
questions for weapons: What trustworthy purpose for life can 
you claim? What do your statements signify? What is the nature 
of truth? This is to say again that the question of meaning 
now occupies the forefront of intellectual activity. 
This question of meaning challenges not only philosophy in 
general but theology in particular, and theology has taken the 
challenge. The problem of meaning, however, does not mark a 
novel effort for theology. In Augustine's historic inquiry into 
the nature of the Trinity one finds, in effect, an example of 
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early concern for the problem of meaning in one of its forms. 
Though Augustine here as elsewhere finally becomes rhetorical 
about the mystery, he does try to show the analogical charac­
ter of the doctrine: The unitary mind that knows, wills, and 
remembers is analogous to God who creates, sustains, and re­
deems, as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. 
But since the beginning of modern science in the seven­
teenth century, a severe restatement of the problem of meaning 
has been in the making. Actually, however, the foreshadowing 
of the conflict between science and religion can be noted as 
early as the sixth century of Greek thought. The horrendous 
symbol of modern science, the mushroom cloud, must wait 2500 
years for its first show. Yet an eminent physicist, Erwin 
Schrodinger, claims that science has thought about the world in 
the Greek way. Learning from this "Greek way" science once of­
fered two hypotheses for its kind of inquiry: first, that 
nature is intelligible, that it can be understood; and second, 
that the observer can be removed from the aspect of nature that 
is being examined. This second hypothesis is of first impor­
tance for this essay. 
When the scientist following, for example, Aristotle makes 
his inquiry into the empirical world, he treats nature as an 
object. To be concerned with an objectified field of observa­
tion is simply to be concerned with something other than the 
salvation of the soul or one's relationship with God or the 
mystery of creation. These last concerns cannot allow the sub­
ject to be removed without destroying their peculiar status. 
Religious faith forces the person back into the picture. If in 
science there is no room for this kind of subjective concern, 
then there is a conflict between science and religion. One way 
to attempt solution of the conflict is through the problem of 
meaning. For, as we shall explain later, this is the problem 
of the relationship between he who knows and what is known. 
But even the first basic hypothesis of science (that nature 
is intelligible) offers a fundamental challenge to theological 
statements. For the God of the Judeo-Christian tradition is a 
mystery in the same way and for the same reasons that anything 
holy is a mystery. He speaks out of the burning bush to Moses 
and with little subtlety thrusts visions and compulsive speeches 
upon the prophets. The New Testament revels in paradoxes, the 
luxuriant flower of mystery: The Word becomes flesh and the Son 
of God dies that man might have life. These are not claims that 
rest upon the scrutability of nature. In fact, they seem to 
have little to do with nature at all. They are rather claims 
about history, which is in effect the drama of the interaction 
of men. Certainly any attempt to record this drama with objec­
tive clarity is difficult. In the nature of the case the field 
of inquiry itself is marked by many traps, obscurities, and 
lacunae. It may be possible to suggest that history is more of 
a mystery than nature, that history is not intelligible as an 
object. This is not to argue finally that history may not 
either have or be given meaning. In fact, this is how religious 
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scriptures deal with real or imaginary events. But by so doing, 
nothing of the mystery of God is eliminated. It seems then that 
theological thought must assert itself against the rigidity of 
empirical inquiry. For it cannot likely discover any method of 
analysis or kind of statement that will illuminate completely 
the mystery of the divine reality. Theology must always claim 
a residuum of human experience that does not submit completely 
to the Greek way of thinking. 
So even theology has taken up the problem of meaning. The 
consequences could well be devastating when the question is 
asked: What means God? For it appears that when answers are 
ventured, they too will be subjected to the relentless power of 
the continuous question of meaning. The future then may honor, 
not faith, but a dramatic and frustrated skepticism. Indeed one 
contemporary theologian-philosopher, Paul Tillich, has recast 
Luther's famous Biblical phrase to the effect that we are justi­
fied by doubt and not by faith as conventionally understood. 
Still theology has been obliged to accept the challenge of this 
question of meaning. The dilemma is deep. Theology has, how­
ever, with various degrees of caution accepted philosophy's lead 
But before the separate responses are illustrated and re­
viewed, we had best sharpen the problem itself. In what sense 
can meaning be a problem for contemporary theology? 
The old claim that religion gives meaning to life implied 
quite simply that with faith in God the Father life somehow 
seemed worthwhile. The rational disposition that we have to 
deal with today will not easily accept such subjective senti­
ments. The problem of meaning does not begin or end with such 
feeble ejaculations. But what, then, is the character of the 
theological concern for meaning? 
Perhaps the problem can be stated thus for theology: To 
ask the question of meaning is to ask about the relationship 
between the knower and the known. The following illustration 
may help. In the book of worship of a large Protestant denomi­
nation is this sentence in the communion ritual: "We have to 
do here not with signs merely, but with the reality that these 
signs represent." The reference is to the bread and wine. In 
Roman Catholic ritual there is neither place nor reason for 
such self-conscious rjeservation about the elements. They do 
not remain symbols at all; they become the realities of body 
and blood. But in the Protestant recitation the bread remains 
the representation of flesh and the wine the representation of 
blood. Here the mind shifts into an analytic gear. The di­
rect dramatic quality of the ritual succumbs to an implicitly 
rational analysis not only of the act itself but also of the 
actors, the worshipping believers. For a secret question 
hovers behind the innocent ritual. What do the bread and wine 
mean? The implication is that they are not what they are of­
fered as. The elements are not body and blood in a literal 
sense; they represent body and blood. And we see the subtle 
separation of symbol from that which is symbolized. In our 
XXIII p. 7 
previous terms, the knower (the worshipper) and the known (the 
bread and wine) are separated by the intervention of a covert 
objectivity. Hence the question: What does the communion mean 
to the worshipper? It is no longer a simple and direct act of 
identification with the God-man who dies carrying the sin of 
the world in his own person. But to say what it is not does not 
say what it does mean. In what precise relationship does the 
knower stand to the known? 
Theological inquiry does not pose the problem of meaning 
in the same way that semantics poses the problem. For in this 
relatively new branch of logic there is no explicit reference 
to the users of the symbols under study and hence meaning re­
mains an objective matter. But the theological solutions to 
the problem of meaning will always have peculiar personal or 
existential bias. That is, the whole intellectual effort 
begins, though it does not necessarily end, with the subject, 
with the one in whom religious experience and knowledge occurs. 
In the following pages are illustrations of six different 
theological ways of dealing with the problem of meaning thus 
conceived. The first two, Kierkegaard and Barth, try to show 
that the relationship between God and man is controlled from 
God's side. For Kierkegaard, meaning can be affirmed if a man 
first knows himself to be confronted by God in Christ. But 
this element of subjectivity is played down in Barth. For him 
significance and truth are radically given into life by God. 
Martin Buber proposes that meaning is discovered in those mo­
mentary relationships in which the armor of familiarity is 
penetrated and the soul is stirred to new sensibility and re­
sponse, These are three existentialist approaches to the prob­
lem of meaning. For these men a certain attitude is necessary 
if purpose, truth, or significance is to be confirmed in 
human experience. 
The contemporary school of analytical philosophy has made 
excursions into theology. A discussion of religious language 
provides an interesting illustration of this recent effort to 
wed a new philosophy with an historic theology. Ian Ramsey 
tries to establish what theological statements and words in 
fact mean, that is, what they signify. Striding over all the 
territory of theological and philosophical thought, Paul Tillich 
attempts with inclusive argument to show that all man's concerns 
a.re ultimately related to his status as a religious being. The 
problem of meaning for Tillich evokes simultaneously the ques­
tions of purpose, truth, and significance. Last in the s'feries 
is Charles Hartshorne. He provides meaning for all the data of 
human experience by organizing them into a coherent, inclusive 
whole. 
Excitement and anguish, adventure and doubt seem to be new 
virtues for men of religion who demand and seek for meaning. 
